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THE END OF PARENS PATRIAE IN NEW YORK:
GUARDIANSHIP UNDER THE
NEW MENTAL HYGIENE LAW
ARTICLE 81
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to
protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent.
Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk
in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding.'
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of
pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not
attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to
obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether
bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by
suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by
compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Guardianship is commonly defined in the following manner:
[a] legal arrangement under which one person (a guardian) has
the legal right and duty to care for another (the ward) and his or
her property. A guardianship is established because of the
ward's inability to legally act on his or her own behalf [e.g.,
because of minority... or mental or physical incapacity].3
The root of guardianship is benevolence.4 The definition of guardian-
ship reflects an intent "to assist and protect persons of limited capaci-
ty."5 However, an examination of the history of guardianship laws
reveals that the price of that benevolent intent has often been borne by
the wards, paid for with their freedom and liberty. An examination of
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (Everyman's Library, Alfred A. Knopf 1992)
(1859).
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 707 (6th ed. 1990) (alteration in original).
i4. Penelope A. Hommel et al., Trends in Guardianship Reform: Implications for the
Medical and Legal Professions, 18 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 213, 213 (1990) [hereinafter
Trends in Guardianship Reform].
"Benevolence" is defined as "[t]he doing of a kind or helpful action towards another,
under no obligation except an ethical one." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 159 (6th ed. 1990).
5. Trends in Guardianship Reform, supra note 4, at 213.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the history of guardianship statutes in New York State reveals how
difficult it can be for a state's legislature and courts to provide the
protections necessary for a ward's welfare without unnecessarily
endangering her freedom as a result of the zeal to protect. Indeed, it
was not until 1992, with the passage of Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene
Law,6 that the word "guardian" was used with respect to the protection
of incompetent adults in the statutes of New York State.
This Comment will examine how the changes in New York guardian-
ship law work to cure prior defects, and at what costs. Part II will
discuss the traditional values and processes of guardianship. Part III will
compare the new guardianship laws of New York State to those they
replaced and discuss the cases that made change necessary and those
which interpret the new law. The conclusion will explicate how the new
law might affect those who must resort to it.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Parens Patriae
The historical foundations for guardianship have been traced to
Rome at the time of Cicero, to legal proceedings for the protection of
the property of incompetents! Guardianship first appears in English
law with the passage of the statute De Praerogativa Regis,9 which
recognized guardianship as a duty of the sovereign to protect and care
for the person and property of the mentally incompetent."0 The term
parens patriae means "parent of the country" and stemmed from the
emerging English concept of the king as father of his subjects."
6. 1992 N.Y. Laws ch. 698.
7. Under New York law prior to the passage of Article 81, a "conservator" was
appointed to care for only the property of an incompetent person, 66 N.Y. JUR. 2D Infants
and Other Persons Under Legal Disability § 331 (1987) (discussing now repealed Mental
Hygiene Law Article 78), and a "committee" was appointed to care for the person and
property of the incompetent. Id. (discussing now repealed Mental Hygiene Law Article 77).
The term "guardian" was used only in matters pertaining to minors (infants). Id. § 114.
8. Peter M. Horstman, Protective Services For The Elderly: The Limits Of Parens Patriae,
40 MO. L. REv. 215, 218 (1975) (citing AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW 1 (rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION
STUDY]). The Horstman article is widely cited, and is especially useful for acquiring an
understanding of the relationship between guardianship proceedings, criminal law, and due
process.
9. 17 Edw. 2, c. 9 (1324), cited in Horstman, supra note 8, at 218.
10. Horstman, supra note 8, at 218.
11. Id
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The legal process that developed for determining an individual's
mental status was a writ de idiota inquirendo,"2 which was tried to a
jury. 3 If the jury found the subject of the proceeding incompetent, the
Chancellor would commit the subject to the care of some friend, who
would be compensated for rendering that care. 4 "The incompetent's
heir was generally made manager of the estate, although according to
Blackstone, 'to prevent sinister practices' he was not given custody of
the incompetent. For the custody of the estate, the heir was responsible
to the court of chancery, to the recovered lunatic, or to his administra-
tor."'" The fiduciary obligations of an heir gradually developed into a
set of customs, rules, and standards for the proper management of a
lunatic's property,16 and were carried over into the United States after
the American Revolution. 7 Exercising a "modified form of parens
patriae,"' the states, applying common law or acting under their own
constitutional or statutory provisions, would exercise jurisdiction "over
the persons and property of the mentally incompetent to assure that
those unable to care for themselves were protected from harm."' 9
The parens patriae power is distinct from the police power of the
state.' It is through the police power that a state intervenes "to
restrict the liberty of individuals who endanger the health and safety of
12. ld. at 218-19. Literally, "inquiring concerning an idiot." Sporza v. German Say.
Bank, 84 N.E. 406, 412 (N.Y. 1908). This expression, as archaic as it sounds, continued to be
used in New York into this century, as seen in Sporza. More commonly seen, however, was
the expression de lunatico inquirendo, which was last used by the Court of Appeals of New
York in In re Coates, 173 N.E.2d 797, 804, (N.Y. 1961); by the Appellate Division in In re
Long, 26 N.Y.S.2d 271,275 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941), rev'd, 40 N.E.2d 247 (N.Y. 1942), and by
the Supreme Court for New York County in In re Schermerhom, 98 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1950) rev'd, 98 N.Y.S.2d 367 (N.Y. App. Div.), affd, 98 N.E.2d 475 (N.Y. 1951). For
a discussion on the different treatment historically between idiots and lunatics, see Horstman,
supra note 8, at 218-19.
13. Horstman, supra note 8, at 219.
14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 8, 13, at 3-4).
16. Id.
17. Horstman, supra note 8, at 219; John J. Regan, Protective Services for the Elderly:
Commitment, Guardianship, and Alternatives, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569, 570-73 (1972).
18. Horstman, supra note 8, 13, at 219.
19. Id. (citing AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 8, at 250). By 1890,
the Supreme Court had suggested that the parens patriae power is rooted in the very nature
of the state in modem society. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1890).
The Court described that power as "inherent in the supreme power of every State ... and
often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity . . . " Id. at 57; Comment,
Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1208
(1974).
20. Trends in Guardianship Reform, supra note 4, at 213.
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the community at large.""1 However, the well-being of the individual
"is the sole justification for the exercise of the state's authority as parens
patriae."2
The most common and obvious exercise of police power is in the
area of criminal law, wherein the state uses its power "in ways that are
manifestly detrimental to the individual."'  Because the exercise of
police power has the potential to cost the individual his or her liberty,
property, or both, "very strict procedural safeguards and a formal
adversarial proceeding always accompany any exercise of the police
power in order to protect individual rights and liberties from arbitrary
infringement."'24 Yet, in spite of the potentially manifest restrictions on
the individual rights and liberties of a ward,25 the states have tradition-
ally exercised their parens patriae powers in an atmosphere of informali-
ty. Relaxed procedures were said to be justified because the proceed-
ings were nonadversarial; the sole preoccupation of the court was to
serve the individual's best interest.26 However, as many commentators
have pointed out, 7 guardianship, especially if plenary, can result in a
deprivation of personal rights and civil liberties which can be devastat-
ing." Indeed, until relatively recently, the constitutional requirement
21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting Horstman, supra note 8, at 221).
23. Trends in Guardianship Reform, supra note 4, at 213.
24. Id.
25. George J. Alexander, Premature Probate: A Different Perspective on Guardianship
for the Elderly, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1003-04 (1979). Professor Alexander suggests that the
following situations, inter alia, create the potential for abuse of a ward's liberties: the guardian
making health treatment decisions contrary to the ward's wishes, including protective
hospitalization, involuntary commitment, and unwelcome therapies including electroconvulsive
therapy; denying the ward the benefit of his or her possessions or savings; channelling funds
away from individuals the ward would like to benefit and toward persons the guardian deems
more suitable; and restricting the expenses paid
to or on behalf of the ward for the purpose of maintaining or enlarging the size of the estate
that will pass upon the ward's death. Professor Alexander's article is recommended for its
discussion of the Living Will as both a preferable substitute for guardianship, as well as its use
by individuals to control their medical treatment in the event of incompetence.
26. Horstman, supra note 8, at 221.
27. See generally Horstman, supra note 8; Alexander, supra note 25; Lawrence A. Frolik,
Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, A Critique and a Proposalfor Reform, 23 ARIz. L. REV.
599 (1981); Guardianship: An Agenda For Reform; Recommendations of the National
Guardianship Symposium and Policy of the American Bar Association, 13 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 271, 282-88 (1989); Louis A. Mezzullo & Michael C. Roach,
The Uniform Custodial Trust Act: An Alternative to Adult Guardianship, 24 U. L. REV. 65
(1989).
28. Horstman, supra note 8, at 231. A detailed, not to mention scathing, analysis of what
a ward stands to lose appears on pages 231-35 in the section titled "Guardianship Proceedings:
[Vol. 79:603
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that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty or property without due
process of law"29 was not applied in the guardianship context even
though there is "nothing in either the Fifth30 or Fourteenth Amend-
ments which limits the applicability of the due process clause to criminal
matters. '32  Fortunately, some states have begun to recognize that
while guardianship can be appropriate and beneficial for some, it can be
highly detrimental to others.33
B. The Trend from Lunatic to Incompetent to Incapacitated Person
The legislative trends reflect a shift in philosophy from the paternal-
istic benevolence of parens patriae to a recognition that individuals who
may need protection due to their limitations may also need protection
from the unnecessary loss of liberty that is frequently a consequence
under the older laws.34 The newer laws incorporate as a purpose the
promotion of autonomy, and achieve this by changing the definition of
incapacity and expressing a preference for limited guardianships.35
A typical "traditional" law would define incompetence by the status
or condition of the subject. An older Michigan law, for example,
deemed incompetent "all persons who are insane, imbecile, idiotic, or
who by reason of old age or disease are mentally incompetent to have
the care, custody and management of their estate."36
The Uniform Probate Code, adopted widely, represents an early
reform effort.37 A typical version reads:
"[I]ncapacitated person" means any person who is impaired by
reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or
disability, advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxica-
tion or other cause, except minority, to the extent that he lacks
sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate
What is at Stake?"
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
30. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31. "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
32. Horstman, supra note 8, at 236.
33. Trends in Guardianship Reform, supra note 4, at 214.
34. Id. at 215.
35. Id
36. MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 703.1(4), cited in Trends in Guardianship Reform, supra note
4, at 215. This language was in use until 1978. Id.
37. Trends in Guardianship Reform, supra note 4, at 215.
1996]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
responsible decisions concerning his person or management of his
affairs3
A statute thus worded is an improvement because of the requirement
that the impairment must rise to a level that renders the subject bereft
of the ability to understand or communicate "responsible decisions."
Nevertheless, the use of words like "mental illness," "advanced age,"
and "responsible" may still invite evaluations of the person's capacity
based on his or her status or condition and encourage value judgments
on whether his or her actions were "responsible," "reasonable," or
"proper."39 Commentators have found such definitions unsatisfactory
"because labels or diagnoses of physical or mental disability may provide
no meaningful indication of the person's ability to function autonomous-
ly."' 40  One writer regards such language as "vague" and "normative,"
the use of which invites arbitrary findings of incapacity.41 Another
warns that the use of such standards "increases the risk that an
individual might lose 'control over decisions governing his/her own life
... for mere idiosyncratic behavior. '' a
The newer generation of statutes either eliminates the reliance on
labels and establishes objective standards for evaluating the subject's
ability to manage personal financial matters,43 or expressly states that
38. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-101.F (Michie 1978)).
39. Trends in Guardianship Reform, supra note 4, at 215.
40. Id.
41. Bobbe S. Nolan, Functional Evaluation of the Elderly in Guardianship Proceedings,
12 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 210 (1984). The author, a certified geriatric nurse practitioner,
was a law student when she wrote this article. The notes to the new Article 81 of the Mental
Hygiene Law of New York cite to it, and many of the concepts promoted therein appear to
have been adopted by the New York legislature. Especially interesting is the use of the
"functional evaluation," discussed at 210-12, which achieves statutory realization in N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(c), which requires the court to consider the "functional level and
functional limitations of the person," and in § 81.09 (Appointment of Court Evaluator). See
infra notes 127-48 and accompanying text.
42. Trends in Guardianship Reform, supra note 4, at 215 (citing Thomas L. Hafemeister
& Bruce D. Sales, Interdisciplinary Evaluations for Guardianships and Conservatorships, 8 L.
& HUMAN BEHAVIOR 335, 338 (1984)).
43. The District of Columbia, for example, provides that "'[i]ncapacitated individual'
means an adult whose ability to receive and evaluate information effectively or to
communicate decisions is impaired to such an extent that he or she lacks the capacity to man-
age all or some of his or her financial resources or to meet all or some essential requirements
for his or her physical health, safety, habilitation, or therapeutic needs without court-ordered
assistance or the appointment of a guardian or conservator." D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2011(11),
enacted in 1987. This definitional section also provides that '[m]anage financial resources'
means those actions necessary to obtain, administer, and dispose of real and personal
property, intangible property, business property, benefits, and income," and that "'[m]eet
essential requirements for physical health or safety' means those actions necessary to provide
[Vol. 79:603
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"[a]ge, eccentricity, poverty, or medical diagnosis alone is not sufficient
to justify a finding of incapacity."' For example, comparing a statute
devoid of language that invites a court to consider labels or status45 to
an earlier reform statute that uses words like "mental illness," "ad-
vanced age," and "responsibility,"46 shows the shift from reliance on a
mere diagnosis to a mandate for evidence of actual incapacity.47
The other common feature of the newer reform statutes is their
preference for limited guardianship, wherein "even if a person is found
to be incapacitated, guardianship is to be used only to the extent
necessary. 4  Under a statute embodying this preference, a guardian
will be granted "only those powers and only for that period of time
necessary to provide for the demonstrated needs of the ward. '49
Typically, a court will be required to "make specific findings regarding
the ward's disabilities and to issue specific orders regarding the extent
of, and limits on, the guardian's powers."' Moreover, the typical
statute will provide that "[a]n incapacitated person for whom a guardian
has been appointed retains all legal and civil rights except those which
have been expressly limited by court order or have been specifically
granted to the guardian by court order."51
In addition to the change in the definition of incapacity and the
preference for limited guardianship, the newer statutes have provided
for reforms both in methods of assessing capacity and in strengthening
procedural safeguards.52 As we shall see, New York has incorporated
all these trends in its new Mental Hygiene Law Article 81.
health care, food, shelter, clothing, personal hygiene, and other care without which serious
physical injury or illness is more likely than not to occur." D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2011(15)-
(16).
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-04.2.a (1989).
45. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2011(11), supra note 43.
46. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. 45-5-101.F, supra note 38.




51. Id. (citing specifically to N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-301.1, and generally to FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 744.331(5) and N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-04.5).
52. See Trends in Guardianship Reform, supra note 4, at 216-21.
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III. COMPARISON OF OLD AND NEW LAWS IN NEW YORK
A. Articles 77 and 78
Prior to the passage of Article 81 (and repeal of Articles 77 and 78)
of the Mental Hygiene Law, the only legal remedy available for dealing
with the needs of an allegedly incompetent person was found in Article
8. Article 78 provided for the appointment of a committee upon a
finding of complete incompetence.5 4 However, such a finding imposed
a stigma on the respondent, and was accompanied by a loss of civil
rights.5 In practice, therefore, the courts became reluctant to invoke
Article 78.56 The result was that, absent the requisite finding of
complete incompetence, concerned parties who sought assistance for an
individual who required no more than property management found no
remedy in the courts. 7
The New York legislature responded in 1972 by passing a conserva-
torship statute, Article 77,58 which provided for "a less restrictive
alternative to the committee procedure."59 The legislature designed
Article 77 to provide a solution for property and financial issues only,
restricting the conservator's authority to the "control, charge and
management of the estate, real and personal, of the conservatee. '
Thus, where the allegedly incompetent person required nothing more
than assistance with financial or property matters, Article 77 provided
the remedy of conservatorship. At the other end of the spectrum, if a
court found the respondent completely incompetent, Article 78 provided
53. 1972 N.Y. Laws ch. 251, replacing sections 100-13 of the Mental Hygiene Law.
54. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 78.01 (Consol. 1989) (repealed 1993). "A committee is
a fiduciary who has powers over a person who is incompetent to manage himself or his affairs
by reason of age, alcohol abuse, mental illness, or other cause, or is a patient in a state mental
facility who is unable to conduct his personal and business affairs." 66 N.Y. JUR. 2D Infants
and Other Persons Under Legal Disability § 331 (1987).
55. G. Oliver Koppell & Kenneth J. Munnelly, The New Guardian Statute: Article 81 of
the Mental Hygiene Law, 65 N.Y. ST. B.J. 16 (1993) (citing RECOMMENDATION OF THE LAW
REVISION COMMISSION TO THE 1992 LEGISLATURE 2 [hereinafter L.R.C. RECOMMEN-
DATION]).
Assemblyman Koppell, chairman of the Assembly Judiciary Committee, was the main
sponsor of the bill. Mr. Munnelly was the Counsel to the Assembly Judiciary Committee, and
helped draft the legislation.
56. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 16.
57. Id.
58. 1972 N.Y. Laws ch. 251.
59. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 16.
60. Id. (quoting N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77.19 (Consol. 1987) (repealed 1993)).
[Vol. 79:603
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the remedy of a committeeship. However, neither Article 77 nor 78
provided a remedy for situations in which the respondent was not
completely incompetent but was in need of limited assistance, perhaps
of a nature that combined both financial and personal needs.
Two 1974 amendments appeared, at first, to provide a narrow bridge
over that gap. The first amendment created a "statutory preference in
both Articles 77 and 78 for the appointment of a conservator.",61 The
second amendment "allowed the conservator to assume a limited role in
protecting the personal wel-being of the conservatee."'6 The extension
of the conservator's authority was limited by the standard for the
appointment of a conservator as set forth in section 77.01(1): "substan-
tial impairment of his ability to care for his property or... [inability] to
provide for himself or others dependent upon him for support."63
However, the need to bridge the gap was sufficiently compelling to
cause many courts to grant "conservators authority over the person of
the conservatee."'  This was a completely understandable solution to
the problem discussed earlier: that when an individual who was not
completely incompetent was in need of something more than assistance
with financial or property matters alone, neither Article 77 nor 78
provided for a well-tailored remedy.
Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals put an end to judicial
bridge-building on April 30, 1991, when it decided In re Grinker
(Rose).65 In Grinker (Rose), the petitioner, who was Commissioner of
Social Services for New York City and desirous of placing the respon-
dent (Seena Rose) in a nursing home, argued that "[A]rticle 77
authorize[d] courts to grant conservators the power to commit their
wards to nursing homes where conservatees' 'well-being' so requi-
re[d]. '66 The petitioner relied on section 77.19,67 which provided that
a conservator appointed under Article 77 "shall have all of the powers
and duties granted to or imposed upon a committee of the property"
appointed under Article 7 8,6S and argued that section 77.19 authorized
courts "to empower conservators to involuntarily commit their wards to
61. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 16 (citing 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 297).
62. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 16 (citing 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 623).
63. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77.01(1) (Consol. 1989) (repealed 1993).
64. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 16 (citing In re Detzel, 521 N.Y.S.2d 6 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1987) and In re Evelyn P., 522 N.Y.S.2d 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)).
65. 573 N.E.2d 536 (N.Y. 1991).
66. IL at 539.
67. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77.19 (Consol. 1989) (repealed 1993).
68. In re Grinker (Rose), 573 N.E. 2d at 539 (quoting N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 77.19).
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nursing homes."'69 The lower courts agreed with the petitioner, finding
support for his position in the following language from section 77.19:
"the court order appointing a conservator shall set forth... [a] plan for
the preservation, maintenance, and care of the conservatee's income,
assets and personal well-being, including the provision of necessary
personal and social protective services to the conservatee., 71
The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner's argument, finding that
the legislative history of the 1974 amendment to Article 77 did not
support "the Commissioner's expansive reach., 71  The legislature's
intent, per the court, "was to ensure that 'older person[s] without close
relatives or friends [are able to] function[ J in the community,' while
'protecting their independence and right to manage their own property
and personal affairs to the greatest possible extent."' 72 The Governor,
adding little in the way of gloss, stated upon signing the bill that "it
would 'enable[ ] the conservator to assume a limited role in protecting
the personal well being of the conservatee."'73 The court, however, was
not convinced of even that expansive a reading, holding that
[a]ssuming, without deciding, that Mental Hygiene Law § 77.19
authorizes a grant of limited power over a conservatee's person
incidentally related to the primary power over property.. ., we
conclude that it clearly does not authorize the potent personal
transformation of involuntary commitment of a conservatee to a
nursing home. The availability of such a significant involuntary
displacement of personal liberty should be confined to a Mental
Hygiene Law Article 78 incompetency proceeding, with its full
panoply of procedural due process safeguards.74
The court concluded that the lower courts had erred "in extending the
beneficial reach of Mental Hygiene Law § 77.19 beyond its central
property and incidental personal borders. 7 1
This decision "highlighted the vacuum that exist[ed] in New York
law regarding persons who may require some assistance but who do not
require the drastic remedy of either a conservator, with its consequent
affront to the integrity and independence of the individual, or a
69. Id. at 539.
70. Id. (quoting N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77.19) (emphasis in original).
71. Id. at 539.
72. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting MEM. OF SENATOR GIUFFREDA, 1974 N.Y.
LEGIS. ANN., at 176, 178).
73. Id. at 539 (alterations in original) (quoting GOVERNOR'S APPROVAL MESSAGES 53-
59, reprinted in 1974 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN., at 397, 399).
74. Id. at 539 (citations omitted).
75. Il at 540.
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committee with its finding of incompetence. 76  Stripped of the
judicially created remedies developed after 1974, New York courts were
once again faced with having to choose between "a remedy which
governs property and finances or a remedy which judges a person
completely incompetent."" After Grinker (Rose), there would be no
further use of Article 77 for anything beyond the meeting of incidental
personal needs. 78
B. The Repeal of Articles 77 and 78 and the Passage of Article 81
1. Purpose of Article 81
In response to Grinker (Rose), the New York State Law Revision
Commission (LRC) proposed the "creation of a single statute, with a
standard for appointment which focuses on the needs of the individual
and permits the appointment of a guardian who can make decisions
regarding either the person or the property of the person, or both if
appropriate., 79 The LRC's proposal was adopted by the legislature in
1992, and became effective in 1993. The situations that led up to the
LRC proposal were incorporated into the legislation itself:
The current system of conservatorship and committee does not
provide the necessary flexibility to meet [the] needs [of persons
with incapacities]. Conservatorship which traditionally compro-
mises a person's rights only with respect to property frequently
is insufficient to provide necessary relief. On the other hand, a
committee, with its judicial finding of incompetence and the
accompanying stigma and loss of civil rights, traditionally involves
a deprivation that is often excessive and unnecessary. Moreover,
certain persons require some form of assistance in meeting their
personal and property management needs but do not require
either of these drastic remedies. The legislature finds that it is
desirable for and beneficial to persons with incapacities to make
available to them the least restrictive form of intervention which
assists them in meeting their needs but, at the same time, permits
76. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 16-17 (quoting L.R.C. RECOMMENDATION,
supra note 55, at 20).
77. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 17.
78. i
79. Id. (quoting L.R.C. RECOMMENDATION, supra note 55, at 4).
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them to exercise the independence and self-determination of
which they are capable.8"
The legislature set forth the purpose of Article 81 in the very same
opening section:
The legislature declares that it is the purpose of this act to
promote the public welfare by establishing a guardianship system
which is appropriate to satisfy either personal or property
management needs of an incapacitated person in a manner
tailored to the individual needs of that person, which takes in
account the personal wishes, preferences and desires of the
person, and which affords the person the greatest amount of
independence and self-determination and participation in all the
decisions affecting such person's life.81
Among the hallmarks of the new Article 81 are most of the measures
adopted by the newer reform statutes in other states,' including a
standard for appointment that focuses on "the decisional capacity and
functional limitations of the person for whom the appointment is sought
rather than on some underlying mental or physical condition of the
person. 83
2. Provisions
a. Power to Appoint a Guardian
"The cornerstone of Article 81 is the concept of appointing a
guardian whose powers are tailored specifically to the particular needs
of a person with respect to personal care, property management or
both."'  The court has the power to appoint a guardian if it deter-
mines:
(1) that the appointment is necessary to provide for the personal
needs of that person, including food, clothing, shelter, health
care, or safety and/or to manage the property and financial affairs
of that person; and
80. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (second through fifth sentences) (Consol. Supp.
1993) (Legislative findings and purpose) (emphasis added).
81. Id. (sixth sentence).
82. See supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
83. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 17 (citing L.R.C. RECOMMENDATION, supra
note 55, at 4).
84. L.R.C. RECOMMENDATION, supra note 55, at 4.
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(2) that the person agrees to the appointment, or that the person
is incapacitated as defined in subdivision (b) of this section."
b. Standard for Appointment of a Guardian
When the person does not agree to the appointment, the court, using
a two-prong test, must find that the person is incapacitated. 6
The determination of incapacity shall be based on clear and
convincing evidence and shall consist of a determination that a
person is likely to suffer harm because:
(1) the person is unable to provide for personal needs and/or
property management; and;
(2) the person cannot adequately understand and appreciate the
nature and consequences of such inability.'
This standard eliminates use of the labels of incompetency and
substantial impairment in Articles 77 and 78 and the requirement found
therein that there be some underlying illness or condition."8
This section requires the court to give "primary consideration to the
functional level and functional limitations of the person." 9 In so doing,
the court must:
(c) ... include an assessment of that person's: (1) management
of the activities of daily living ...; (2) understanding and
appreciation of the nature and consequences of any inability to
manage the activities of daily living; (3) preferences, wishes, and
values with regard to managing the activities of daily living; and
(4) the nature and extent of the person's property and financial
affairs and his or her ability to manage them.
It shall also include an assessment of (i) the extent of the
demands placed on the person by that person's personal needs
and by the nature and extent of that person's property and
financial affairs; (ii) any physical illness and the prognosis of such
illness; (iii) any mental disability... alcoholism or substance
dependence.., and the prognosis of such disability, alcoholism
or substance dependence; and (iv) any medications with which
85. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(a)(1)-(2) (Consol. Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
86. Id § 81.02(a)(2).
87. Id. § 81.02(b)(1)-(2).
88. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 17 (citing L.R.C. RECOMMENDATION, supra
note 55, at 3).
89. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(c) (Consol. Supp. 1993). The terms "functional
level" and "functional limitations" are defined in §§ 81.03(b) and (c) respectively. See infra
notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
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the person is being treated and their effect on the person's
behavior, cognition and judgment.
(d)In addition, the court shall consider all other relevant facts
and circumstances regarding the person's (1) functional level; and
(2) understanding and appreciation of the nature and conse-
quences of his or her functional limitations.0
As should be evident from the foregoing, New York courts are now
statutorily charged with making an extensive functional evaluation of a
person before they may exercise their power to appoint a guardian.9'
This is consistent with prior New York Court of Appeals holdings. In
Rivers v. Katz,92 a case in which patients in a mental hospital refused
to be treated with antipsychotic drugs, the court held that "there must
be a judicial determination of whether the patient has the capacity to
make a reasoned decision ... before the drugs may be administered
pursuant to the State's parens patriae power."93  The court stated
specifically that a determination of incapacity to make a decision for
oneself is "uniquely a judicial, not a medical function," 94 and is only to
be made at a hearing at which the patient is afforded representation by
counsel, and where the State "would bear the burden of demonstrating
by clear and convincing evidence the patient's incapacity .... ."'
Whether a functional evaluation as extensive as Article 81 requires
is best conducted by a court of law is a valid question. However, as will
be seen below, the legislature anticipated this criticism by requiring the
appointment of a court evaluator 96 to assist the court in meeting its
heavy obligation.
c. Least Restrictive Form of Intervention, Functional Level, and
Functional Limitations
Section 81.03 provides definitions for several terms appearing in
Article 81, among the most important of which are "least restrictive
form of intervention," "functional level," and "functional limitations."
90. Id. § 81.02(c)-(d). "Activities of daily living" is defined § 81.03(h).
91. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 18.
92. 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986), reh'g denied, 498 N.E.2d. 438 (N.Y. 1986).
93. Id. at 344.
94. Id. at 343 (citing Rogers v. Commissioner of Dept. of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308
(Mass. 1983)); In re Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981).
95. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 344. Accord In re Grinker (Rose), 573 N.E.2d at 539-40.
96. See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
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When appointing a guardian, the court is to be guided by the concept
of "least restrictive form of intervention."97 The term
means that the powers granted by the court to the guardian with
respect to the incapacitated person represent only those powers
which are necessary to provide for that person's personal needs
and/or property management and which are consistent with
affording that person the greatest amount of independence and
self-determination in light of that person's understanding and
appreciation of the nature and consequences of his or her
functional limitations.98
"The concept of 'least restrictive form of intervention' is an expression
of the doctrine of 'least restrictive alternative."'99 The Supreme Court
established that doctrine in Shelton v. Tucker,"0 and requires that
"even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamen-
tal personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."''
The doctrine was first applied in a civil commitment setting in Lake v.
Cameron,"° wherein the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that "[d]eprivations of liberty solely because
of dangers to the ill persons themselves should not go beyond what is
necessary for their protection,"" and that any "alternative course of
treatment or care should be fashioned as the interests of the person and
of the public require in the particular case."' 4
The term "functional level," which is one of the two primary
considerations the court shall use in reaching its determination under
section 81.02(c), 5 is defined as "the ability to provide for personal
needs and/or the ability with respect to property management.',
0 6
According to the LRC, the term is intended to be "a neutral term which
encourages those participating in the guardianship proceeding to
97. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 18.
98. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.03(d) (Consol. Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
99. L.R.C. RECOMMENDATION, supra note 55, at 7.
100. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
101. IL at 488.
102. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1965).
103. Id. at 660.
104. Id (emphasis added).
105. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
106. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.03(b) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
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consider the abilities of the person and not just to focus on the person's
limitations.,
117
The other mandatory consideration is "functional limitations," which
are defined as "behavior or conditions of a person which impair the
ability to provide for personal needs and/or property management.' '10
The LRC explains that this definition focuses the court on the behavior
or circumstances of the allegedly incapacitated person that impair his or
her "ability to provide for personal needs or financial or property
management.""' 9
Throughout the statute, the stress is on "functional levels" and
"limitations" rather than diseases, underlying medical conditions,
diagnoses, and labels. 0  The definitions support that intention."'
Hence, it should no longer be possible for a petitioner to obtain court-
ordered protection for an allegedly incapacitated person by the mere
offer of medical evidence of dementia or Alzheimer's Disease.
d. Procedural Requirements and Safeguards
Section 81.07 sets forth the notice requirement of Article 81. It
provides the manner of service, and the time in which it must be
accomplished (within fourteen days prior to the return date of the
application)."' "Notice to the allegedly incapacitated person must be
written in 12-point type and in plain language, so as to inform the
person of his or her rights and the powers sought for the guardian in a
107. LAW REVISION COMMISSION COMMENTARY, reprinted in the notes to N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.03 (Consol. Supp. 1993) [hereinafter L.R.C. COMM. with a reference
to the notes under which section the commentary appears].
108. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.03(c) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
109. L.R.C. COMM., supra note 107, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.03
(Consol. Supp. 1993).
110. Id.
111. The other terms defined in § 81.03 are "guardian" (which may be a person 18 years
or older, a corporation, public agency, or a county court), "available resources" (which include
such things as visiting nurses, home health aides, and adult day care, as well as powers of
attorney and trusts), "personal needs" (such as food, clothing, shelter, health care, and safety),
"property management" (which means "taking actions to obtain, administer, protect, and
dispose of real and personal property, intangible property, business property, benefits, and
income and to deal with financial affairs"), "activities of daily living" (which include mobility,
eating, dressing, housekeeping, cooking,
shopping, money management, and other activities related to personal needs and to property
management), and "major medical or dental treatment" (which means, generally, anything
involving anesthesia, risk, invasion, pain, discomfort, debilitation, significant recovery period,
or psychotropic medication or electroconvulsive therapy; but does not include anything
regarded as "routine"). N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.03(a), (e)-(i) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
112. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 18.
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manner that can be reasonably understood.""' Furthermore, the same
papers must be served, by mail or in person, on the spouse of the
allegedly incapacitated person, parents of the person (if living), any adult
children, any adult siblings, and persons with whom the allegedly
incapacitated person resides."4 If none of the aforementioned people
receives notice, then it must be served on "at least one and not more
than three of the living relatives of the person alleged to be incapacitat-
ed in the nearest degree of kinship who are known to the petitioner or
whose existence and address can be ascertained ... with reasonably
diligent efforts[.]" 5 Other persons entitled to service include:
those designated by the allegedly incapacitated person pursuant to
a valid durable power of attorney or living will,"6
any person or organization with a demonstrable genuine interest in
promoting the best interests of the person,"7
113. IeL Section 81.07(c) provides that the order to show cause must carry the following
legend (in 12-point type or larger, bold face, and double spaced):
IMPORTANT
An application has been filed in court by - who believes you may be
unable to take care of your personal needs or financial affairs. - is asking that
someone be appointed to make decisions for you. With this paper is a copy of the
application to the court showing why - believes you may be unable to take
care of your personal needs or financial affairs. Before the court makes the
appointment of someone to make decisions for you the court holds a hearing at
which you are entitled to be present and to tell the judge if you do not want anyone
appointed. This paper tells you when the court hearing will take place. If you do
not appear in court, your rights may be seriously affected.
You have the right to demand a trial by jury. You must tell the court if you
wish to have a trial by jury. If you do not tell the court, the hearing will be
conducted without a jury. The name and address, and telephone number of the
clerk of the court are: _
The court has appointed a court evaluator to explain this proceeding to you and
to investigate the claims made in the application. The court may give the court
evaluator permission to inspect your medical, psychological, or psychiatric records.
You have the right to tell the judge if you do not want the court
evaluator to be given that permission. The court evaluator's name, address, and
telephone number are: _
You are entitled to have a lawyer of your choice represent you. If you want the
court to appoint a lawyer to help you and represent you, the court will appoint a
lawyer for you. You will be required to pay that lawyer unless you do not have the
money to do so.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.07(c) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
114. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.07(d)(ii) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
115. Id. § 81.07(d)(iii).
116. Id. § 81.07(d)(iv).
117. Id. § 81.07(d)(v).
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the attorney for the person alleged to be incapacitated,'18
the court evaluator,11 9
the local department of social services if it is known to the petitioner
that the respondent receives public assistance or protective servic-
e,120
the director of any facility operating under terms defined elsewhere
in which the allegedly incapacitated person resides,12 1 and
"such other persons as the court may direct based on the recommen-
dation of the court evaluator .... "122
That section 81.07 sets forth ten categories of persons who are to be
notified of the petition (including the person alleged to be incapacitated)
is ample indication of the seriousness with which the legislature views
the threat to the liberty of the respondent. The LRC states that section
81.07 "broadens the group of persons upon whom service shall be
required in order to involve persons who may be able to shed some light
on the situation but who under former Articles 77 and 78 would not be
entitled to service.""' That someone might have no legal relation to
the respondent is no longer relevant under Article 81.
Section 81.08 sets forth the requirements for the petition, which must
be verified under oath. 24 There are fifteen additional requirements,
which fall into six general categories of information:
(1) an explanation of the functional level of the person alleged
to be incapacitated; (2) the reasons for the guardianship; (3) the
available alternative resources that have been. explored; (4) the
particular powers sought and their relationship to the functional
level of the person; (5) the proposed guardian and the reasons
why the proposed guardian is suitable; (6) any conflicts of
interest between the petitioner and the person alleged to be
incapacitated and any proposed guardian."
Taking sections 81.07 and 81.08 together, one can appreciate the
level of concern the legislature had for the rights of the respondent. On
one hand, there is the large number of persons entitled to be notified
118. Id- § 81.07(d)(vi).
119. 1& § 81.07(d)(vii).
120. Ia § 81.07(d)(viii).
121. Id. § 81.07(d)(ix).
122. Id. § 81.07(d)(x).
123. L.R.C. COMM., supra note 107, in the notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 81.07 (Consol. Supp. 1993).
124. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.08(a) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
125. L.R.C. COMM., supra note 107, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.08
(Consol. Supp. 1993).
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under section 81.07, encompassing virtually anyone who might be in a
position to provide the court with assistance in performing its functional
evaluation.
On the other hand, there is the extensive and detailed information
that section 81.08 requires to be set forth in the petition. Not only must
the petitioner state his or her reasons for seeking the appointment of a
guardian, the petitioner must explain the functional level of the
respondent and the other alternatives that have been explored. This is
in keeping with the "least restrictive form of intervention" requirement
and puts the court on notice as to what has and has not been attempted
with respect to the respondent. Moreover, the petitioner is required to
state what powers he or she seeks for the guardian and how those
powers relate to the functional level of the respondent. Under this
requirement, a petitioner seeking a broad mandate for the guardian will
be required to allege all facts pertaining to the functional level of the
respondent that would justify such broad authority.
The statute also requires the petitioner to identify the proposed
guardian and to explain why that particular person is suitable. This
implies that, just as a diagnosis of dementia or old age will no longer be
sufficient grounds for a finding of incompetency, merely being the
respondent's close relative or business partner will not necessarily satisfy
a court as to one's suitability for the role of guardian. This concern may
be seen in the requirement that the petition reveal any conflicts of
interest between the petitioner and the respondent, and between the
respondent and any proposed guardian.' 26
e. Court Evaluator and Counsel
Article 81 does not provide for a guardian ad litem. This is because,
according to the LRC, it was not always clear whether the guardians ad
litem appointed under prior laws "were acting as advocates for the
person who was the subject of the proceeding, or as neutral 'eyes and
ears' of the court."'27 When a guardian ad litem reasonably believes
that the subject person is in need of protection, but that person resists,
then the guardian cannot both advocate for that person's wishes and be
126. "Conflict of interest" is not defined in Article 81, and an examination of situations
that might give rise to a conflict in the Article 81 context is beyond the scope of this
Comment. However, it does not seem unrealistic to this writer that a court would be cautious
when the petitioner or proposed guardian is a potential beneficiary under the respondent's
will, or is a partner or co-venturer in a business or investment.




honest with the court. The ethical waters are muddied further when the
guardian ad litem is paid by a party whose interests are not being served
undividedly. The new law alleviates this internal conflict by distinguish-
ing between the two roles of the former guardian ad litem and creating
two separate positions: the counsel, whose client is the person alleged to
be incapacitated, and the court evaluator, whose responsibility is to be
the court's neutral observer and reporter, and creating separate rules to
govern each.1"
Section 81.09 requires that the court appoint a court evaluator to
"act as an independent investigator to gather information to aid the
Court in reaching a determination about the person's capacity, the
availability and reliability of alternative resources, and assigning the
proper powers to the guardian."'29 The court evaluator's duties,
specified in the statute, are "designed to provide guidance and direction
to the court evaluator in fulfilling his or her role in the proceeding.""O'
That role is to "provide the court with [the evaluator's] 'personal
observations as to the person alleged to be incapacitated and his or her
condition, affairs and situation."""'
128. l
129. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 18.
130. L.R.C. COMM., supra note 107, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09
(Consol. Supp. 1993).
131. Id.; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(c)(5) (Consol. Supp. 1993). Subsection (c)(5)
also requires the court evaluator to provide information obtained in response to specified
questions:
(i) does the person alleged to be incapacitated agree to the appointment of the
proposed guardian and to the powers proposed for the guardian;
(ii) does the person wish legal counsel to be appointed or is the appointment
of counsel in accordance with section 81.10 of this article otherwise appropriate;
(iii) can the person alleged to be incapacitated come to the courthouse for the
hearing;
(iv) if the person alleged to be incapacitated cannot come to the courthouse, is
the person completely unable to participate in the hearing;
(v) if the person alleged to be incapacitated cannot come to the courthouse,
would any meaningful participation result from the person's presence at the hearing;
(vi) are available resources sufficient and reliable to provide for personal needs
or property management without the appointment of a guardian;
(vii) how is the person alleged to be incapacitated functioning with respect to
the activities of daily living and what is the prognosis and reversibility of any
physical and mental disabilities, alcoholism or substance dependence? The response
to this question shall be based on the evaluator's own assessment of the person
alleged to be incapacitated to the extent possible, and where necessary, on the
examination of assessments by third parties, including records of medical,
psychological and/or psychiatric examinations obtained pursuant to subdivision (d)
of this section. As part of this review, the court evaluator shall consider the
[Vol. 79:603
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The court may choose as an evaluator:
any person drawn from a list maintained by the office of court
administration with knowledge of property management, personal
care skills, the problems associated with disabilities, and the
private and public resources available for the type of limitations
the person is alleged to have, including, but not limited to, an
attorney-at-law, physician, psychologist, accountant, social
worker, or nurse .... 132
diagnostic and assessment procedures used to determine the prognosis and
reversibility of any disability and the necessity, efficacy, and dose of each prescribed
medication;
(viii) what is the person's understanding and appreciation of the nature and
consequences of any inability to manage the activities of daily living;
(ix) what is the approximate value and nature of the financial resources of the
person alleged to be incapacitated;
(x) what are the person's preferences, wishes, and values with regard to
managing the activities of daily living;
(xi) has the person alleged to be incapacitated made any appointment or
delegation [under a durable power of attorney] or
a living will;
(xii) what would be the least restrictive form of intervention consistent with the
person's functional level and the powers proposed for the guardian;
(xiii) what assistance is necessary for those who are financially dependent upon
the person alleged to be incapacitated;
(xiv) is the choice of proposed guardian appropriate, including a guardian
nominated by the allegedly incapacitated person . . .; and what steps has the
proposed guardian taken or does the proposed guardian intend to take to identify
and meet the current and emerging needs of the person alleged to be incapacitated
unless that information has been provided to the court by the local department of
social services when the proposed guardian is a community guardian program...;
(xv) what potential conflicts of interest, if any, exist between or among family
members and/or other interested parties regarding the proposed guardian or the
proposed relief;
(xvi) what potential conflicts of interest, if any, exist involving the person
alleged to be incapacitated, the petitioner, and the proposed guardian; and
(xvii) are there any additional persons who should be given notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(c)(5) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
132. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(b)(1) (Consol. Supp. 1993). Article 81 also
provides that court evaluators satisfy an education requirement:
(a) Each incapacitated person is entitled to a court evaluator whom the court
finds to be sufficiently capable of performing the duties of a court evaluator
necessary to ensure that all the relevant information regarding a petition for the
appointment of a guardian comes before the court and to assist the court in reaching
a decision regarding the appointment of a guardian.
(b) Each person appointed by the court to be an evaluator must complete a
training program approved by the chief administrator which covers: (1) the legal
duties and responsibilities of the court evaluator; (2) the rights of the incapacitated
person with emphasis on the due process rights to aid the court evaluator in
1996]
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Under prior law, an appointed guardian ad litem was likely to be an
attorney, who would act as both an advocate for the respondent and an
evaluator for the court. 133 However, those roles "blurred and contrib-
uted to the confusion and delay in the proceeding."' ' By distinguish-
ing between the roles, Article 81 permits the court to choose an
evaluator whose sphere of expertise is closely aligned with the functional
limitations likely to be considered in the proceedings.
Nevertheless, Article 81 still contemplates that the proceedings may
be adversarial,'135 and provides that "[a]ny person for whom relief...
determining his or her recommendation regarding the appointment of counsel and
the conduct of the hearing; (3) the available resources to aid the incapacitated
person; (4) an orientation to medical terminology, particularly that related to the
diagnostic and assessment procedures used to characterize the extent and
reversibility of any impairment; (5) entitlements; (6) psychological and social
concerns relating to the disabled and frail older adults.
(c) The court may, in its discretion, waive some or all of the requirements of
this section or impose additional requirements. In doing so, the court shall consider
the experience and education of the court evaluator with respect to the training
requirements of this section.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.40 (Consol. Supp. 1993). There appears to be no concern that
many court evaluators will not have had legal training other than that provided for in § 81.40.
The Law Revision Commission comments:
Court evaluators play a significant role in the guardianship proceeding. In order
to provide the court with a useful evaluation of the person who is alleged to be
incapacitated the court evaluator should have thorough knowledge of both the
evaluator's responsibilities and medical and mental health terminology, particularly
relating to diagnostic and assessments procedures, the side effects of medications, the
myths and the process of aging, and community services and programs. Waiver of
the training requirement should only occur if the person appointed court evaluator
has education and experience in the training areas required under this section.
L.R.C. COMM., supra note 107, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81A0 (Consol.
Supp. 1993).
133. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 18-19. See also supra notes 127-28 and
accompanying text.
134. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 19.
135. Indeed, the entire process is simplified greatly if the person alleged to be
incapacitated "agrees to the appointment." N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(a)(2) (Consol.
Supp. 1993). Even so, a court will not appoint a guardian unless it determines "that the
appointment is necessary to provide for the personal needs of that person ...... Id.
§ 81.02(a)(1).
The adversarial nature of the process is further acknowledged in § 81.12 (burden and
quantum of proof), which provides that "[t]he court may, for good cause shown, waive the
rules of evidence." Id. § 81.12(b) (first sentence). However, the good cause exception "does
not apply to the admission of the court evaluator's report and any supporting affidavits
thereto." L.R.C. COMM., supra note 107, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.12
(Consol. Supp. 1993). A prerequisite to admission is that the evaluator be subject to cross-
examination, and "that if the court determines that information contained in the report is
... not sufficiently reliable, the court shall require that the person who provided the
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is sought shall have the right to be represented by legal counsel of the
person's choice." ' 6 Although the appointment of a court evaluator is
mandatory under Article 81,137 the appointment of counsel is not.38
However, the court must appoint counsel in any of the following seven
circumstances:
(1) the person alleged to be incapacitated requests counsel;
(2) the person alleged to be incapacitated wishes to contest
the petition;
(3) the person alleged to be incapacitated does not consent to
the authority requested in the petition to move the person
alleged to be incapacitated from where that person presently
resides to a nursing home or other residential facility... or other
similar facility;
(4) if the petition alleges that the person is in need of major
medical or dental treatment and the person alleged to be
incapacitated does not consent;
(5) the petition requests temporary powers pursuant to
section 81.23 of this article [provisional remedies, e.g., appoint-
ment of a temporary guardian];
(6) the court determines that a possible conflict may exist
between the court evaluator's role and the advocacy needs of the
person alleged to be incapacitated;
(7) if at any time the court determines that appointment of
counsel would be helpful to the resolution of the matter.1 39
Even if the person alleged to be incapacitated refuses assistance of
counsel, the court may appoint counsel "if the court is not satisfied that
the person is capable of making an informed decision regarding the
appointment of counsel."'"
The role of counsel "is to represent the person alleged to be
incapacitated and ensure that the point of view of the person alleged to
be incapacitated is presented to the court."' 4' The LRC contemplates
that the counsel will fulfill the traditional role of the advocate, expecting
that
information testify and be subject to cross examination." § 81.12(b) (second sentence).
136. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10(a) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
137. Id. § 81.09(a).
138. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 19.
139. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10(c) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
140. Id- § 81.10(d).




[a]t a minimum that representation should include conducting
personal interviews with the person; explaining to the person his
or her rights and counseling the person regarding the nature and
consequences of the proceeding; securing and presenting evidence
and testimony; providing vigorous cross-examination; and offering
arguments to protect the rights of the allegedly incapacitated
person.14
2
Article 81 provides that both the court evaluator and the appointed
counsel shall be compensated and permits fee-shifting.143 When the
petition is successful, compensation is charged to the respondent.'"
If the petition fails, the court may require compensation to be paid by
the "petitioner or by the person alleged to be incapacitated, or both in
such proportions as the court may deem just."'45  As should be
apparent, a respondent of modest means may suffer financially from all
the protection Article 81 provides. In contemplation of that problem,
the statute provides that "[i]f the court appoints counsel under [section
81.10], the court may dispense with the appointment of a court evaluator
or may vacate or suspend the appointment of a previously appointed
court evaluator." '146 Although this is not a perfect solution, it is the
only appropriate outcome: by recognizing that "counsel's advocacy role
142. Id.
143. "When judgment grants a petition, the court may award a reasonable allowance to
a court evaluator ... payable by the estate of the allegedly incapacitated person." N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(f) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
"The court shall determine the reasonable compensation for.., any attorney appointed
pursuant to this section. The person alleged to be incapacitated shall be liable for such
compensation unless the court is satisfied that the person is indigent." l& § 81.10(f).
144. Id. §§ 81.09(f) and 81.10(f). In one case when the court "granted the petition to
appoint a guardian, it ordered payment of a fee to the New York City Commissioner of Social
Services, citing [Mental Hygiene Law] § 81.16(f) which authorizes payment of a fee to either
the Attorney General or the attorney for a local department of social services." Bonnie
Cohen, Mental Hygiene Law § 81 After One Year, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 13, 1994, at 1.
145. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(f) (Consol. Supp. 1993). In a case in which the
petition was denied, the court refused to allow payment to the court evaluator out of the
funds of the respondent, and ordered the petitioner to pay the evaluator. In re Presbyterian
Hospital (Early), N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1993, at 22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993). In another case, the court
ordered the Nassau County Department of Social Services to pay both the court evaluator
and the Mental Hygiene Legal Service, who was appointed counsel. In re Gelezewski,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1993, at 30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
There is one case reported in which, after denying the petition, the court ordered that
the court evaluator be paid out of the respondent's assets, but denied payment of the
petitioner's attorney out of the respondent's assets. In re Chachkers (Weissberg), N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 25, 1994, at 21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). There is no provision in Article 81 for compensating
the petitioner's attorney.
146. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10(g) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
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will provide protection for the allegedly incapacitated person, and that
some estates may be financially overburdened by the expenses of both
the court evaluator and counsel,"'47 the legislature has chosen protec-
tion of the respondent's interests over the court's need for a neutral
evaluating party. 4s
f Hearing
Section 81.11 requires that a "determination that the appointment of
a guardian is necessary for a person alleged to be incapacitated shall be
made only after a hearing."'49 Moreover, "[t]he hearing must be
conducted in the presence of the person alleged to be incapacitated,
either at the courthouse or where the person alleged to be incapacitated
resides . . . ."" This is a significant requirement and serves a three-
fold purpose: first, it permits judges to make "first hand observations
and draw first hand impressions of the allegedly incapacitated per-
son[;]"'' second, it "permits [the person alleged to be incapacitated]
to be part of the decisionmaking process, thereby recognizing, respecting
and preserving the person's dignity[;]"' and third, it contemplates that
"the person's presence may allow the person to accept the appointment
of a guardian more easily than someone who has been excluded from
the process even by the best of intentions."' 3
There are only two circumstances under which the respondent will
not be required to attend: first, when the respondent is not present in
the state; or second, when "all the information before the court clearly
establishes that (i) the person.., is completely unable to participate in
the hearing or (ii) no meaningful participation will result from the
147. L.R.C. COMM., supra note 107, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10
(Consol. Supp. 1993).
148. It was the safer course constitutionally as well. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (which calls for full and formal pre-termination hearing when a liberty or property
interest is at stake) and Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (which calls for a balancing
of three factors: the private interest to be affected by official action; the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of that interest at the hand of official action, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and the government's interest, taking into
account the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail).
149. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.11(a) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
150. Id § 81.11(c).






person's presence at the hearing."'"M These exceptions are designed to
permit the hearing to proceed without the person alleged to be
incapacitated "only if the judge is convinced that the person is complete-
ly unable to participate in the hearing or no useful purpose would be
,,155served by the person's presence ....
The presence requirement addresses a concern as to the reliability
of written observations.16 Although the statute requires appointment
of a neutral court evaluator, as an additional measure of protection for
the respondent's liberty and property rights (especially if the judge has
waived the court evaluator requirement under section 81.10(g)), the
statute requires the judge to make his or her own evaluation. 157
According to the LRC, "disparities often exist between what is written
on paper and what is deduced from observing the person first hand
[because] [i]nformation on paper tends to underrate capacity." '158
This requirement appears to have been inspired by the decision in
Grinker (Rose),'59 wherein the physician testified that the respondent
was a "schizophrenic who is 'incapable of managing any kind of
activities requiring long range planning . . .""60 and the guardian ad
litem recommended that a conservator be appointed because she seemed
"incapable of . . . do[ing] anything to generate any income ... "6
However, the respondent's own testimony convinced the court to deny
the petition because it showed "her reflective competence, awareness
and weighing of her precarious financial situation.' ' 62
Finally, the person's presence "allows the court to draw a carefully
crafted and nuanced order which takes into account the person's dignity,
autonomy, and abilities because the judge has had the opportunity to
learn more about the person as an individual rather than a case
description in a report."'6"
Both the burdens on and the powers in the hands of the judge are
impressive: She must order a neutral evaluation of and representation
154. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.11(c) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
155. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 19.
156. Id.
157. L.R.C. Comm., supra note 107, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.11
(Consol. Supp. 1993).
158. I& (citation omitted).
159. 573 N.E.2d 536 (1991).
160. Id. at 537.
161. Id. at 537-38.
162. Id. at 540.
163. L.R.C. CoMM., supra note 107, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.11
(Consol. Supp. 1993).
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for the respondent (subject to the financial hardship exception) and have
the respondent present at the hearing even if it means traveling to the
respondent's residence; and yet she may completely override the
recommendations of the evaluator on the basis of impressions she makes
within the relatively short time span of the hearing itself. While it is
true that most respondents who in an earlier time would have had their
liberty somewhat casually restricted would enjoy tremendous protection
under Article 81, we must realize that if fate lends its hand and bestows
upon the respondent a "lucid moment" at just the right time, a petition
otherwise rightfully brought might be denied.
The prospect of a judge ignoring the evidence that results from the
considerable amount of resources necessary to comply with the
requirements of Article 81, merely from exposure to the respondent in
the unnatural environment of a hearing, is alarming. It is not unreason-
able to speculate that the specter of a judicial finding based more on
impressions than evidence might increase the cost of what already
appears to be a fairly expensive process.'64 The desire to minimize the
risk of such an outcome might result in more lengthy hearings due to the
submission of more evidence than would otherwise have been necessary,
more investigative time spent by the court evaluators (which might
require hiring more of them to cope with demand), and more appeals,
as well as the possibility of pressure on the respondent to perform in
certain ways at the hearing.
g. Burden and Quantum of Proof
As under prior Article 77, a "determination that a person is
incapacitated must be based on clear and convincing evidence."'6 The
petitioner carries the burden of proof." Additionally, the rules of
evidence apply (although the court may waive them for good cause
shown). 67 The court evaluator's report may be admitted even though
the report "contains hearsay statements and observations of other
164. See In re Lepkowski, 623 N.Y.S.2d 995 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (where attorney fees
of over $11,000 were deemed excessive, petitioner was responsible for difference between
reasonable amount charged to ward's estate and total bill); see also In re Spingarn, 626
N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (ward's estate held responsible for only $32,500 of
petitioner's attorney fees where attorneys had billed a total of 230 hours "on a relatively
simple matter" at hourly rates from $220 to $415 per hour).
165. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 19; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.12(a)
(Consol. Supp. 1993).
166. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.12(a), second sentence.
167. id. § 81.12(b).
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professionals"' ' if the court evaluator testifies, is subject to cross-
examination, and the court determines that the report is reliable.
h. Findings
Article 81 requires that if the court appoints a guardian, it must
make certain findings on the record. 169 What findings will be required
will "depend on whether the appointment is voluntary, for personal
needs, or for property management."' 7  There are four findings
common to all appointments: (1) the person's functional limitations
which impair the person's ability to provide for personal needs, property
management, or both; (2) the necessity of the appointment to prevent
harm; (3) the specific powers of the guardian which constitute the least
restrictive form of intervention; and (4) duration of the appointment.171
The findings necessary for nonvoluntary appointments are that "the
person lacks an understanding and appreciation of the nature and
consequences of his or her functional limitations and is likely to suffer
harm" arising from those functional limitations and the inability to
understand their consequences. 7 2
i. Powers of the Guardian
The powers of the guardian with respect to property management
are governed by section 81.21,73 while those with respect to personal
needs are governed by section 81.22.174 Each section provides a non-
exclusive list of powers which may be granted to the guardian. 75
The section governing property management embodies the doctrine
of "substitut[ion] of judgment,' 76 which requires the guardian to act
in the manner the incapacitated person would have "if he or she had the
capacity to act., 77 The source of the doctrine in New York is In re
168. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 20; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.12(b)
(Consol. Supp. 1993).
169. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.15(a)-(c) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
170. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 20.
171. Id.
172. L.R.C. COMM., supra note 107, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.15
(Consol. Supp. 1993).
173. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 55, at 20.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Florence.78 Section 81.21 also recognizes that "prior competent
choices of the person will be given effect."' 79
The section governing personal needs provides a list of personal care
powers that includes deciding whether he or she should travel and where
he or she should live.Y The most important personal care power,
however, is the ability to "consent to or refuse generally accepted
routine or major medical... treatment."' 8' The section instructs that
these decisions are to be made "in accordance with the patient's wishes,
including the patient's religious and moral beliefs, or if the patient's
wishes are not known and cannot be ascertained with reasonable
diligence, in accordance with the person's best interests ... ."'82 The
source of the "best interests" doctrine in New York is Rivers v.
Katz." As embodied in section 81.22, a consideration of the ward's
best interest includes his or her dignity and uniqueness; the possibility
and extent of preserving his or her life; preserving, improving, or
restoring health or functioning; relief of suffering; adverse side effects
associated with treatment; and availability of less intrusive alternative
treatments.Y Finally, section 81.22 specifically prohibits a guardian
from revoking any advance directives (e.g., durable powers of attorney,
Do Not Resuscitate Orders, and Living Wills).Y
178. 530 N.Y.S.2d 981 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1988).
179. L.R.C. COMM., supra note 107, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21
(Consol. Supp. 1993).
180. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.22(a) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
181. Id § 81.22(a)(8).
182. Id. (emphasis added).
183. 495 N.E.2d 337, 344 (N.Y. 1986).
184. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.22(a)(8) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
185. 1l § 81.22(b)(2). As is the case with court evaluators (see supra note 132),
guardians are subject to an education requirement. The law provides:
(a) Each incapacitated person is entitled to a guardian whom the court finds to
be sufficiently capable of performing the duties and exercising the powers of a
guardian necessary to protect the incapacitated person.
(b) Each person appointed by the court to be a guardian must complete a
training program approved by the chief administrator which covers: (1) the legal
duties and responsibilities of the guardian; (2) the rights of the incapacitated person;
(3) the available resources to aid the incapacitated person; (4) an orientation to
medical terminology, particularly that related to the diagnostic and assessment
procedures used to characterize the extent and reversibility of any impairment; (5)
the preparation of annual reports, including financial accounting for the property and
financial resources of the incapacitated person.
(c) The court may, in its discretion, waive some or all of the requirements of
this section or impose additional requirements. In doing so, the court shall consider
the experience and education of the guardian with respect to the training
requirements of this section, the duties and powers assigned to the guardian, and the
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j. Effect on the Incapacitated Person of Appointment of a Guardian
In keeping with the goal of providing the least restrictive form of
intervention, section 81.29 contains three significant provisions: first,
"[a]n incapacitated person for whom a guardian has been appointed
retains all powers and rights except those powers and rights which the
guardian is granted[;]"' 6 second, "appointment of a guardian shall not
be conclusive evidence that the person lacks capacity for any other
purpose, including the capacity to dispose of property by will[;]"' and
third, "title to all property of the incapacitated person shall be in such
person and not in the guardian." '8 Furthermore, "[t]he property shall
be subject to the possession of the guardian and to the control of the
court for the purposes of administration, sale or other disposition only
to the extent directed by the court order appointing the guardian.' 1 9
As to the right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, Article 81 does
not change New York law, nor does it represent an impediment to such
change."9 As of this writing, the right to decline treatment has not
been extended to third parties when the patient is unable to do so
"unless a health care proxy or Do Not Resuscitate Order is in place or
there is otherwise clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes
regarding such treatment expressed while the patient was compe-
tent."191
3. Case Law Interpretation of Article 81
a. In re Rochester Gen. Hosp.
As of this writing, there have been few cases arising under Article 81
that have reached the appellate level, but there have been several at the
trial level. One of the more interesting ones is In re Rochester Gen.
Hosp. (Levin).192
needs of the incapacitated person.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.39 (Consol. Supp. 1993).
186. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.29(a) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
187. Id. § 81.29(b).
188. Id. § 81.29(c).
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. L.R.C. COMM., supra note 107, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.29
(Consol. Supp. 1993).
191. Id. (citation omitted).
192. 601 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
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In Rochester, the person alleged to be incapacitated, Mr. Levin, had
been a patient at the petitioner hospital for one year. He was originally
admitted for medical problems experienced while a resident at a nursing
home. The hospital began Article 81 proceedings because the patient's
son (to whom the father had previously granted a health care proxy and
appointment as power of attorney) had refused to cooperate with the
hospital in obtaining Medicaid reimbursement to cover the more than
$75,000 in hospital expenses.'93
The court issued an order to show cause in conformity with the
requirements of section 81.07 (which sets forth the bold face large print
requirement) in that it advised Mr. Levin, inter alia, "that a court
evaluator had been appointed to explain the proceeding and investigate
the claims made in the application."'94 However, the court never did
appoint a court evaluator, but did appoint the Mental Hygiene Legal
Service as his counsel, pursuant to section 81.10.195 The court, recog-
nizing its error, kept the petition alive by noting that it has discretion,
under section 81.10(g), not to appoint a court evaluator in cases where
counsel is appointed.196
The court supported its decision to appoint counsel instead of a court
evaluator by reasoning that when a respondent wishes to contest the
petition, refuses to consent to a request for transfer to a nursing home,
or when the order to show cause includes the provisional remedy of an
appointment of a temporary guardian pursuant to section 81.23(a), then
the court must appoint counsel, pursuant to section 81.10(c)(2).' 9
Because this court already had appointed a temporary guardian, the
court held that appointment of counsel was mandatory.98 However,
the court found another ground, albeit unnecessary, for mandatory
appointment of counsel: as Mr. Levin was found (later in the opinion)
to be incapacitated to the extent that he could not consent to transfer
to a nursing home, it follows that he "could not consent to the appoint-
ment of a guardian and should be considered as in the same position as
193. Id. at 377. The hospital may file a petition under N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 81.06(a)(6) as "a person otherwise concerned with the welfare of the person alleged to be
incapacitated." Id.
194. Ild.
195. Id. In addition, the court appointed a temporary guardian, pursuant to § 81.23,
(which provides for provisional remedies) "in order to complete the Medicaid application
process, which was due to expire prior to the return date of the application." ld.
196. Id
197. Id at 377-78.
198. Id. at 378.
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an [allegedly incapacitated person] who wishes to contest the peti-
tion.1
199
This bit of judicial sleight-of-hand has not been challenged because
Rochester has not been appealed. Therefore, it is law in New York that
if a court finds a respondent incapacitated in accordance with the
requirements of Article 81, then that later finding may be used to
support the earlier exercise of discretion by that same court to appoint
counsel instead of a court evaluator. From the point of view of the
respondent, this provides greater protection of his or her interests
(assuming that the appointed counsel assumes the role of advocate and
not that of evaluator). Nevertheless, it is inevitable that this portion of
the opinion will be criticized for using a finding to support a prefinding
decision.
As discussed earlier, the purpose of dividing the internally conflicting
roles of the former guardian ad litem between the court evaluator and
the counsel was to eliminate the conflict inherent in the role.200 The
exception that permits a court to dispense with appointment of a court
evaluator when counsel has been appointed arises when the appointment
of both threatens the financial condition of the respondent. 2°' There
is no mention in the statutes that the counsel is to accede to both roles
in such a circumstance. However, the court in Rochester held that
"there is no reason why counsel could not perform most of these same
services, ', 20 thereby returning New York to the pre-Article 81 days of
guardians ad litem and their inherent conflicts of interest. This court
appears to have misunderstood the purpose of section 81.10(g), which
is to provide relief to an estate "financially overburdened by the
expenses of both the court evaluator and counsel."' A holding that
would have been more in keeping with the intention of section 81.10(g)
would have been to rely on the adversarial process and its requirement
that the petitioner meet his or her burden of proof by clear and
convincing evidence of incapacity, and that such proof be subject to
vigorous cross-examination. It appears to this writer that the Rochester
court was wrong when it saw "no reason why counsel could not
perform" both roles.2'
199. Id
200. See supra notes 127-48 and accompanying text.
201. Id.
202. Rochester, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
203. L.R.C. COMM., supra note 107, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10
(Consol. Supp. 1993).
204. Rochester, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
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The Rochester court ultimately found that Mr. Levin was an
incapacitated person as defined by section 81.02(1) and (2).2°' In
keeping with the requirement that the respondent be at the hearing, the
court commenced the hearing at the hospital due to Mr. Levin's physical
inability to be brought to the courthouse.' °  Based upon its own
observations at that hearing, as well as the testimony of the psychiatrist
who examined Mr. Levin, it was "apparent that [he] was completely
unable to participate in the hearing and that no meaningful participation
would result from his continued presence."' The remainder of the
proceeding was held at the courthouse.' However, Article 81
requires that the court "give primary consideration to the functional
level and functional limitations of the person."' The term "functional
level" is defined to include "the ability to provide for personal needs
and/or the ability with respect to property management, 210 and
"functional limitations" takes into account the "behavior or conditions
of a person which impair the ability to provide for personal needs and/or
property management., 21 ' As discussed earlier, there is nothing in the
language of Article 81 that uses terms of diagnosis or status,2 12 yet this
court relied on the psychiatrist's testimony, which disclosed that "Mr.
Levin suffers from a severe, progressive dementia, which may be
ascribed to senile brain disease, arteriosclerotic deterioration and/or
Alzheimer's disease."'2" Although it appears from the opinion that the
psychiatrist's diagnosis was accurate, that is entirely beside the point.
What Article 81 requires is that the court hear testimony as to the
respondent's functional level and limitations. The facts of this case
indicate that Mr. Levin's functional level was extremely low and his
functional limitations were profound.214 This court failed to under-
stand that among the purposes of Article 81 is the promotion of a
system of guardianship that meets a person's needs based on his or her
205. Id. at 379.
206. Id. at 378.
207. Id
208. Id
209. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(c) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
210. Id § 81.03(b).
211. Id. § 81.03(c).
212. See supra notes 84-111 and accompanying text.
213. Rochester, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
214. Id. at 378-79.
1996]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
functional level and limitations, personal wishes, preferences, and
desires, rather than diagnoses or labels. 5
Regardless of the flaws in how the court reached its decision, it was
correct to grant the petition. Another issue facing this court, however,
was whether the power of attorney and health care proxy Mr. Levin had
previously executed, naming his son as attorney and proxy, should
"obviate the necessity for the appointment of a guardian. 2 16 It was
clear from the facts that the son was at best "vague and uncertain" as
to his father's needs, 217 and at worst guilty of misappropriating the
funds of his father's business, which he was running.18 Yet among the
factors the court must consider is whether there has been a previous
execution of a power of attorney, a health care proxy, or a living
will.219 Furthermore, although the court may in its discretion grant
broad powers to the guardian, "a guardian is expressly prevented from
revoking any such appointment or delegation." 2  With these facts and
laws before it, the court set about removing the obstacle of the son.
The court began by finding that the power of attorney granted to the
son was provided for in the General Obligations Laws of New York,21
which provide that "this power of attorney shall not be affected by the
subsequent disability or incompetence of the principal."' Next, the
court found that section 5-1601(2) of the General Obligations Law
provides that in the event a committee or conservator is thereafter
appointed for the principal, the attorney-in-fact named under section 5-
1601(1) is to account to the committee or conservator. The court also
found that Article 81, as amended, provides that section 5-1601(2)
215. Oddly, the court seems to agree. In its discussion of the powers of the guardian,
the court stated that by enacting Article 81:
The legislature eliminated the 'diagnostic labels,' required under former Articles 77
and 78, and defined incapacity in terms of a person's functional limitations or
inability to provide for personal needs and/or property management....
Based upon the rationale behind enactment of Article 81, the terms 'disability'
or 'incompetence' may no longer have relevance in terms of appointment of a
guardian ....
Id. at 380.
216. Id. at 379.
217. Id The son could not remember how many times he had seen his father during
a year of hospitalization, nor could he remember when he had last visited. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.19(d) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
220. Rochester, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 380 (citing N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.22(b)(2)
(Consol. Supp. 1993)).
221. I&
222. Id. (citing N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1601(1) (Consol. 1989)).
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applies to guardians appointed under Article 81,' and that General
Obligations Law section 5-1601(2) grants a committee or conservator (or
in the case under Article 81 as amended, guardian) the "same power as
a principal 'to revoke, suspend or terminate all or any part of such
power of attorney,' and this, of course, is in direct conflict with the
provisions of Mental Hygiene Law section 81.22(b)(2)."224  At this
point, the court correctly questioned "the continued viability of certain
aspects of General Obligations Law, Section 5-1601, and in particular,
the authority of a guardian to revoke a power of attorney."'  Fur-
thermore, the court correctly recognized that no guardian could revoke
the power of attorney "previously granted to Mr. Levin's son," and that
it would constitute "an anomaly if a guardian were precluded from
making responsible decisions for the preservation of a person's property
because the same decision making authority had been previously
granted, under a power of attorney, and the grantee thereof is unwilling
or unable to fulfill his or her duties."' As it was the opinion of the
court that Mr. Levin's son was both unwilling and unable to fulfill his
duties, it exercised its considerable discretion in fashioning a remedy.
The court's first step was to appoint the previously temporary
guardian as permanent guardian for the property of Mr. Levin 7
Although it recognized that the guardian "would be unable to revoke
the previously executed power of attorney," the court held that "there
should be nothing to prevent a court of competent jurisdiction to
exercise its inherent powers to set aside such power of attorney under
appropriate circumstances" and, as its second step, directed "that the
appointment of [the] son, under the power of attorney and its delegation
of authority to him be revoked."'  The court's third step was to
direct the newly appointed guardian to assume those property manage-
ment powers granted in the previously executed power of attorney, to
resolve the Medicare situation at the hospital, and to "commence a
proceeding to discover property of Mr. Levin which may have been
withheld by his son or others, including, but not limited to the proceeds
from the sale of real property." 9 The court recognized that although
223. Idl (citing 1992 N.Y. Laws ch. 698, § 4, effective Apr. 1, 1993, as amended).
224. Id. at 380. As discussed earlier, § 81.22(b)(2) prohibits a guardian from revoking
any such directives. See supra notes 190-91, 220 and accompanying text.
225. Id.
226. IM at 380-81.





it had the power to revoke the previously executed power of attorney
with respect to property management, it could not achieve the same
result with respect to the health care proxy due to the prohibition
against revoking a health care proxy under section 81.22(b)(2).'
However, the court invoked Public Health Law section 2992(2), which
provides that an agent named in a health care proxy can be removed
"on the ground that the agent ... is not reasonably available, willing
and competent to fulfill his or her obligations under this article."'"
The court noted that section 2992(2) provides that a conservator or
committee (or in the case under Article 81 as amended, guardian) may
petition for removal. Therefore, as the last step in removing the son,
the court authorized the newly appointed guardian to commence a
special proceeding under section 2992(2) to remove Mr. Levin's son as
the agent under the health care proxy. 2
b. Other Cases Under Article 81
In the relatively short time Article 81 has been in force, there have
been other trial level cases both granting and denying petitions for
guardianship. 3  The most interesting ones, however, are those that
have denied the petition.
In In re Lambriggerl the respondent was an eighty-five year old
woman who was paralyzed from a stroke. Although the respondent was
unable to move or communicate verbally, the court would not "make
assumptions regarding her mental acuity" nor would it "compound her
physical tragedy with the additional indignity of unnecessarily circum-
venting her right to self-determination. .. ."" After ascertaining that
she understood her situation, as well as some relatively sophisticated
aspects of her late husband's estate, the court denied the petition.
However, the court did recognize that although the respondent was
capable of making decisions, she would need assistance in carrying them
out, and appointed her daughter, the petitioner, as a "special guardian
to assist [the respondent] in the preparation and execution of any forms,
documents or other papers as may be necessary for her to implement
any property management decisions she may make .... 236
230. Id.
231. Id. (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2992(2) (Consol. 1989)).
232. Id. at 381.
233. See Cohen, supra note 144.
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In In re Heumann,2' 7 the respondent was an eighty-two year old
man who had been living in a nursing home for four years. The
petitioner was his son, who had been living in Israel for eighteen years,
and who now wanted to bring his father to live near him in a "first class
facility." 8 The hearing was conducted at the nursing home so that the
father could be present. The son alleged that his father was too
impaired from Alzheimer's Disease to care for himself or his property,
and further alleged that he wanted to take care of his father because he
considered it "his religious and moral obligation" to do so. 9 He
offered a letter from his rabbi in Israel so stating.240
Although the physician who examined the father testified that he was
unable to make rational decisions about his care, the court concluded
otherwise. At the hearing, the father testified accurately as to his
whereabouts for the past four years, and stated that he preferred to
remain where he was rather than go to Israel because he did not think
he would be able to "get around" there.24'
The courts in both cases made it clear that were it not for the
requirement in Article 81 that the respondent be present at the hearing,
the outcomes might have been different. However, the outcome in
Heumann is somewhat less compelling than in Lambrigger. In Lam-
brigger, the result was well-tailored. The respondent received only that
assistance necessary at the time, and the daughter-petitioner was given
a modicum of control over her mother's welfare. In Heumann, however,
the court may have given short shrift to the petitioner's interests by
allowing what may have been the father's "lucid moment" to get in the
way of the son's desire to care for and be with his father in his final
years.
This raises a serious concern about the extent to which the judge
should be allowed to base his or her decision on the in-court observa-
tion. While there may have been sound countervailing reasons why the
petitioner's father in Heumann should not have been moved to Israel (a
psychiatrist employed by the nursing home in which Mr. Heumann
resided submitted an affidavit advising that moving him would be
detrimental to his health), there was substantial evidence to the contrary
as well. The judge in Heumann, however, appeared to be more







impressed by the fact that the respondent was able to remember the
names of the nursing homes he had been in recently than by any of the
other evidence offered as to his serious limitations.
IV. THE EFFECT OF ARTICLE 81 ON THOSE WHO RESORT To IT
Article 81 provides tremendous protection to the personal and
property interests of a respondent who does not consent to appointment
of a guardian. The procedural protections are ample: notice must be
served on a potentially large number of persons who may be in a
position to shed light on the respondent; notice must be served on the
respondent in large print and in plain language; a court evaluator must
be appointed (subject to a financial hardship exception) to explain the
seriousness of the proceeding; the petition must be verified and specific
as to why the petitioner believes guardianship is indicated; the hearing
is required to be held in the presence of the respondent; the burden is
on the petitioner to prove the incapacity alleged by clear and convincing
evidence; and petitioner may bear the cost of the court evaluator and
respondent's court-appointed counsel if he or she fails to meet that
burden.242
The substantive protections are substantial as well. The court may
appoint a guardian only upon a finding of incapacity that is based upon
consideration of factors pertaining to functional level and limitations,
and the ability of the respondent to understand the consequences of
those limitations. The court may not rely on diagnoses, labels, or status.
If the court does appoint a guardian, it must grant to him or her only
those powers necessary to meet the specific needs identified by the
court.2 43
From the point of view of the petitioner, however, the climb is steep.
Benevolence and good intentions will not suffice, nor will the word of
the family doctor or neurologist. Unless the petitioner can afford good
legal counsel, not only might the petition fail, but the petitioner may be
charged for the cost of the court evaluator and court-appointed
counsel.2" On one hand, this policy is likely to discourage the filing
of petitions prematurely, as well as some inspired by venal motives. On
the other hand, a good faith petitioner might take an unnecessarily
conservative approach and wait as long as possible, perhaps too long,
242. See supra notes 112-72 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 79-111, 173-91 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
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before filing. Under Article 81, a potential petitioner must weigh
numerous financial, medical, and legal factors in coming to her decision,
and that is likely to be an expensive proposition.
The petitioner does not necessarily assume all the risk. If the
petitioner waits until something serious happens (like a physical injury
or the respondent setting a fire in the home) as a way of lowering the
risk of an adverse outcome in court, then it is the respondent who bears
some of the costs of the heightened protections available under Article
81, a risk not necessarily knowingly and voluntarily assumed. This
situation puts the petitioner and his or her attorney in a position of
some ethical ambiguity.
The petitioner must also take into account the possibility of the
judge finding the evidence insufficient to grant the petition when
weighed against the performance of a respondent having a moment of
lucidity in court.245 Again, the respondent, who but for his or her
moment of lucidity would be afforded necessary protection, bears the
risk to his or her well-being should the petitioner delay bringing the
petition until evidence of the respondent's incapacity is sufficient to
overwhelm a judge's inclination to deny the petition. Practitioners
should be watching the opinions to see which judges appear more likely
to be moved by in-court performance, and when the petitioner has little
choice of court, advise the petitioners accordingly. That the judge's
findings must be specific and on the record2' limits her from acting
capriciously, but because the burden is on the petitioner and the
presumption is one of capacity, this requirement is more likely than not
to tip the scale in favor of denying the petition. Hence, the petitioner
is left with little choice but to proceed upon thoughtful deliberation,
weighing the cost of preparing and bringing a petition that might be
denied against the cost to the respondent of delay.
From the point of view of the court, Article 81 places demands on
judicial resources that modern courts may be ill-prepared to provide.
The procedural requirements are precise, the factors to be considered
are numerous, and the hearing may need to be held away from the
courthouse. The process is designed to produce substantial amounts of
evidence, all of which must be taken into account if the court decides to
appoint a guardian, for the powers delegated must be precisely
defined.247 Furthermore, proceedings under Article 81 take preference
245. See supra notes 149-63 and accompanying text.
246. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.15 (Consol. Supp. 1993).
247. See supra notes 85-185 and accompanying text.
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over all other causes in New York courts.2' Practitioners will need to
take into consideration the effects this burden will have on their cases.
Of special concern is the role of the court evaluators, who are dependent
on the courts for their employment. Should a heavily burdened court
begin to give court evaluator assignments to those persons who save the
court the most time, perhaps by doing the minimal amount of investiga-
tion necessary to satisfy the demands of the statute, with the result that
certain evaluators are more respondent-friendly than others, practitio-
ners will have to do the additional preparation necessary to bring a case
that outweighs the evaluator report.
From the practitioner's point of view, the intentions of Article 81
may have been somewhat undermined, as our earlier discussion of
Rochester suggests.249 Counsel for the respondent, in a case in which
the court dispenses with the court evaluator, now has reason to be
unsure of his or her role, although the author recommends that
appointed counsel assume the role of advocate. Furthermore, the
attorney drafting advance directives for a competent client must now be
aware of how deftly the court in Rochester disposed of an attorney-in-
fact/health care agent it disliked.'
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Because meeting the requirements of Article 81 is likely to be
difficult, a petitioner may not succeed in having a guardian appointed
for someone who may truly be in need of a guardian if the petitioner
fails to convince the court of that need by the required quantum of
proof."  Furthermore, the process is expensive. But these are
248. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.13 (Consol. Supp. 1993). The full text of the section
is as follows:
Unless the court, for good cause shown, orders otherwise, a proceeding under
this article is entitled to a preference over all other causes in the court. Unless the
court, for good cause shown, orders otherwise, the hearing or trial shall be
conducted within the time set forth in subdivision (a) of section 81.07 of this article.
A decision shall be rendered within forty-five days of the date of the signing of the
order to show cause, unless for good cause shown, the court extends the time period
for rendering the decision. In the event the period is extended, the court shall set
forth the factual basis for the extension. The commission shall be issued to the
guardian within fifteen days after the decision is rendered.
Id.
249. See supra notes 192-232 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 216-32 and accompanying text.
251. Mezzullo & Roach, supra note 27, at 68.
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concerns that should be addressed well before the need for an appointed
guardian ever arises.
Because an appointed guardian is subject to the supervision of the
court, it is the court that establishes the scope of the guardian's role, and
the guardian is subject to the court's direction and supervision. 2
Conversely, a trustee takes her powers from a trust document, which
embodies the instructions a competent person wishes carried out on her
behalf in the event of a later incapacity 3 Therefore, one of the
better strategies for dealing with Article 81 is to avoid its invocation.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment to suggest every
alternative to guardianship, it does appear that parties resort to it when
the incapacitated person does not have in place advance directives,
executed while competent, that provide instructions, wishes, and
intentions with respect to property, personal needs, and health care. As
the possibility is realistic that a "testator might become physically or
mentally incapacitated months or even years before death,"' some
mechanism for carrying out the wishes and preferences of the person
would obviate the need for a guardianship." A recent appellate
decision in New York, In re Maher, supports this conclusion, holding
that "where the allegedly incapacitated person has effectuated a plan for
the management of his affairs," such a plan obviates the need for a
guardian. 6 The plan in Maher was not sophisticated: the respondent
had granted a power of attorney to his lawyer and added his wife as a
signatory on his bank accounts. The court deemed this sufficient
evidence of the respondent's appreciation for his own handicaps with
respect to his assets insofar as he effectuated a plan for their manage-
ment.57
While Maher might lead some to conclude that a relatively simple
plan will obviate the need to pursue an Article 81 proceeding, practitio-
ners should keep in mind the lesson of Rochester,"8 wherein the court,
motivated by its dislike for the respondent's unlikable son, assiduously
undid the respondent's appointments of both power of attorney and
health care proxy. Backup appointments would appear to be advisable
under the circumstances.
252. Id.; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.20 - .39 (Consol. Supp. 1993).
253. Mezzullo & Roach, supra note 27, at 68.
254. 1L at 69.
255. 1&
256. In re Maher, 621 N.Y.S.2d 617, 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
257. Id.
258. See supra notes 216-32 and accompanying text.
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The commissioners on Uniform State Laws have provided a
mechanism, the Uniform Custodial Trust Act (UCTA), whereby
individuals can provide for management of assets in the future in the
event of incapacity.2 9  The UCTA permits a person to designate a
future custodial trustee to receive property upon the occurrence of some
future event."6  Under the UCTA, a custodial trust affords the
declarant (who becomes the beneficiary) and his or her dependents
protection against possible future incapacity of the beneficiary without
the necessity of a guardianship.261 Furthermore, under the UTCA, the
incapacity of the beneficiary does not terminate any of the following: the
custodial trust, the designation of a successor trustee, any power of
authority of the trustee, or the immunities of third persons relying on
actions of the trustee.262
A custodial trust created pursuant to the UCTA is inexpensive to
create, is flexible to administer, and does not require a court proceeding
either at creation or during operation.2" It would appear, therefore,
that the UCTA, by providing for an inexpensive estate planning tool
that anticipates incapacity, has the potential to reduce the inevitable
burden Article 81 places on New York courts. The New York State
legislature should consider its adoption.
VI. SUMMARY
After hundreds of years of benevolent treatment, incapacitated
residents of New York are less likely than ever to have their rights and
liberties abridged without due process of law. However, those who do
not plan for incapacity must rely on the highly expensive and adversarial
259. UNIF. CUSTODIAL TRUST AcT, 7A U.L.A. 8, prefatory note at 8-9. (Cum. Supp.
1995). An extensive discussion of the UCTA may be found in Mezzullo & Roach, supra note
27, at 74-82.
As of this writing, the UCTA has not been adopted in New York, but has been adopted
in 11 states. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.60.010 - .990 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-72-401 to -
422 (Michie 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 554B-1 to -22 (1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 68-1301 to -
1322 (1989); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 203B, § 1-19 (1994); MINN. STAT. §§ 529.01 - .19 (1990); MO.
REV. STAT. §§ 404.400 - .650 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-7-501 to -522 (Michie 1992); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 18-13-1 to -22 (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-34.1 to -34.19 (Michie 1990); and
Wis. STAT. §§ 880.81 - .905 (1991-92). UNIF. CUSTODIAL TRUST AcT, 7A U.L.A. 8, (Cum.
Supp. 1995).
260. UNIF. CUSTODIAL TRUST AcT § 3(a).
261. Id., prefatory note at 9. See also Mezzullo & Roach, supra note 27, at 74-82.
262. UNIF. CUSTODIAL TRUST ACT § 10(f), 7A U.L.A. 12 (Cum. Supp. 1995); Mezzullo
& Roach, supra note 27, at 77.
263. Mezzullo & Roach, supra note 27, at 85.
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process of an Article 81 guardianship proceeding. The risks run both
ways: Petitioners who bring their cases with an insufficiency of evidence,
prematurely, or both, run the risk of bearing the respondent's costs of
the proceedings; and respondents who are truly in need of protection but
who have failed to plan for it may have to wait until their well-being is
truly compromised before enough evidence is available to persuade the
trier by the required quantum of proof
Therefore, estate planning attorneys, in addition to engaging in their
traditional concern over the minimization of taxes and the securing of
"sensible treatment" of their clients' beneficiaries,264 should advise
their clients of the risks associated with reliance on the guardianship
laws, and the benefits of advance planning for incapacity.
NEIL B. POSNER
264. Id. at 69.
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